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New Communications Technology:
The Emerging Antitrust Agenda
By MICHAEL BOTEIN*
Introduction
The last few years have witnessed the emergence of several new
communications technologies, such as cable television,' subscrip-
tion television (STV), multipoint distribution systems (MDS),*
and perhaps eventually direct broadcast satellites (DBS).' All of
these technologies are able to deliver a panoply of entertainment
programming and other communications services-such as chil-
dren's programming, sporting events, first-run movies, and data re-
trieval-which would have been viewed as the sheerest blue sky a
decade ago.' The economics of each of these technologies, however,
differ.
It is impossible to predict, of course, which of these services will
survive over the long term. After all, the economics of these new
technologies will take time to shake down. Furthermore, develop-
ment of each system is subject to the vagaries of relatively uncer-
tain consumer and capital markets.6 It seems safe to assume, how-
ever, that the advent of these new technologies represents the
single most significant change in the telecommunications industry
since network television.
The new technologies may cause substantial changes in-and
thus economic disruption to-the telecommunications industry.
For the first time in several decades, there is significant competi-
* Professor of Law and Director, Communications Media Center, New York Law School.
B.A., 1966, Wesleyan University; J.D., 1969, Cornell University; J.S.D., 1979, Columbia Uni-
versity; Of Counsel, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York.
1. For a brief description of cable, see text accompanying note 5, infra.
2. For a brief description of STV, see text accompanying note 61, infra.
3. For a brief description of MDS, see text accompanying note 61, infra.
4. For a brief description of DBS, see text accompanying note 71, infra.
5. Note, The Development of Video Technology, 25 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 789 (1980).
6. For example, the bottom effectively dropped out of the capital market for cable televi-
sion in the early 1970's.
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tion for the radio and television industry; moreover, a host of new
firms may enter the industry.7 Since the antitrust laws are a tradi-
tional means of resolving economic warfare, the near future proba-
bly will see increased antitrust litigation in the telecommunications
industry. The trend toward economic deregulation may be the
most significant reason for this prediction.
Federal,' state and local authorities' have caught the deregula-
tion fever. Regardless of the merit of a particular deregulatory ac-
tion, it has certain inescapable consequences on the legal environ-
ment in which these new technologies exist. Regulated firms
traditionally use the regulatory process as a means of working out
economic conflicts. In the telecommunications industry, perhaps
the most dramatic example of this strategy was the television in-
dustry's highly successful campaign to "freeze" the development of
cable television.' 0 If deregulation prevents firms from using the ad-
ministrative process to resolve economic conflicts, they presumably
will turn to other means-such as the antitrust laws"-to achieve
the same objectives.
Second, deregulation generally facilitates new entry-such as
that of the new technologies-into an industry. New entry, in turn,
causes increased demand by existing firms for legal protection
through regulatory, antitrust, or political processes." Elimination
of regulatory processes may create battles in the antitrust and po-
litical arenas.
Deregulation also removes traditional defenses to antitrust liti-
gation created by administrative action under rubrics such as pri-
mary jurisdiction," exclusive jurisdiction, 4 agency immunization,"
7. Many of the new entrants into telecommunications, such as banks, have traditionally
been telecommunications users, not providers.
8. See Malrite T.V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming FCC's
repeal of restrictions on cable systems' use of "distant" broadcast television signals).
9. See MASS. GEN. L. ANN. Ch. 166A (West 1976).
10. A. Pearce, The Economic and Political Power of the Television Networks, in NET-
WORK TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (M. Botein & D. Rice eds. 1980).
11. See Baker, Competition and Regulation: Charles River Bridge Recrossed, 60 CORNELL
L. REV. 159 (1975).
12. See T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
13. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is predicated on an attitude of judicial self-re-
straint and is applied when a court feels that a dispute should be handled by an administra-
tive agency created by the legislature to deal with such problems. For example, a deregu-
lated common carrier may lose its traditional claim to exclusive FCC jurisdiction. See
Botein, Primary Jurisdiction: The Need for Better Court/Agency Interaction, 29 RUTGERS
L. REV. 867 (1976).
14. Exclusive jurisdiction is not jurisdiction in the traditional sense but a power which a
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and the like. One of the intangible side-effects of deregulation is,
therefore, to increase regulated firms' exposure to antitrust
liability.
As regulatory structures wither away, antitrust litigation, partic-
ularly with regard to new technologies, will play a growing role in
the telecommunications industry. It seems fair to anticipate that
indeed a primary focus for antitrust litigation will be the new tech-
nologies. Of course, the type and extent of antitrust litigation will
vary with the economic development of each new technology. It
thus may be useful to briefly review present and potential issues in
the context of particular technology.
I.
Cable Television
Cable television operators use coaxial cables, signal processers,
amplifiers and other related electronic equipment to offer a wide
variety of services-such as high-quality retransmission of conven-
tional broadcast signals, data retrieval, and shopping at
home"'-to both residential and commercial users. In order to op-
erate, a cable system usually must have a franchise or similar au-
thorization from the relevant local and/or state governmental
body." Although most franchises tend to be non-exclusive-and in
many states by statute must be 18-the capital-intensive nature of
the cable business generally makes it unprofitable for more than
one system to operate in the same area." Competition among cable
operators thus tends to focus upon getting franchises. Little mean-
ingful price or service competition is feasible on a continuing basis
since cable operators virtually never compete head-to-head for cus-
tomers. 0 A number of antitrust issues thus may arise in relation to
court or agency may exercise over an action or person to the exclusion of all other adjudica-
tory bodies. Id.
15. A substantial amount of immunity has been made available to industries regulated by
the Civil Aeronautics Board, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1382, 1384, (1976) Federal Communications Com-
mission, 47 U.S.C. § 322, (1976) Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5, 5b, 20,
(1976) and the Federal Maritime Commission, 46 U.S.C. §§ 813a, 814 (1976).
16. Supra note 5, at 793-94.
17. See e.g., N.Y. EXEC. L. § 815(b) (C.L.S. 1975). See M. Hamburg, Franchising and
Local Regulation in ALL ABOUT CABLE 237-61 (1979).
18. Cable-Vision, Inc. v. Freeman, 324 So. 2d 149 (Fla. App. 1976); Capitol Cable, Inc. v.
City of Topeka, 209 Kan. 152, 495 P.2d 885 (1972).
19. R. POSNER, CABLE TELEVISION: THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL MONOPOLY 1, 8-9 (1970).
20. Contra, Henderson, Municipal Ownership of Cable Television: Some Issues and
Problems, 3 CoMm/ENT L.J. 667 (1982).
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the franchising process.
Perhaps the most far-reaching question is whether local munici-
palities may limit or interfere with cable television expansion and
operation in a manner that would otherwise be violative of federal
antitrust law. The Supreme Court of the United States recently
held in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder that
cities were not automatically immune from the antitrust laws in
regulation of cable television."
In that case, Boulder enacted an "emergency" ordinance prohib-
iting the expansion of Community Communication's existing and
franchised cable system for a period of three months. During this
time, the City was to draft a model cable television ordinance and
invite additional cable operators to enter the market under the
terms of that ordinance. The City's action was in response to tech-
nological advances which made practicable the expansion of Com-
munity's operations as well as the entrance of other operators into
the market. Although Community held a non-exclusive franchise
and other cable operators apparently would have agreed to similar
franchise terms, the City decided that despite the technological
feasibility of free cable competition only one cable operator could
serve Boulder; the City decided that open competition would not
produce the "best" cable television operations for the area."
The District Court held that the city not only lacked antitrust
immunity under the "state action" doctrine," but also violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act by having been involved in a vaguely
defined conspiracy not to do business with Community.' The
Court of Appeals reversed rather summarily, holding that the City
did possess antitrust immunity."
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that
Boulder's moratorium ordinance was not exempt from antitrust
scrutiny under the "state action" doctrine as announced in Parker
v. Brown.26 The decision was confined to a clarification of the
21. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
22. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 709 (10th Cir.
1980) (Markey, J., dissenting).
23. See Susman & Wawro, State Action Immunity and Antitrust Issues in Cable Televi-
sion Franchising, 3 CoMM/ENT L.J. 645 (1982).
24. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1039-40 (D.
Colo. 1980), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980). The district judge did not explain how he
had found the requisite section 1 conspiracy.
25. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (1980).
26. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). For explanation of the Parker doctrine see Susman & Wawro,
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Parker doctrine as it applies to "home rule" municipalities. The
Court's decision is, therefore, a discussion of the threshold issue of
immunity vis-A-vis the "state action" doctrine and not a discussion
of the extent of municipalities liability.
The Boulder decision is founded on principles of federalism; im-
munity flows only to the sovereign authority of the state.17 There-
fore, municipal exemption from federal antitrust scrutiny arises
only where the allegedly violative act constitutes an action of the
state itself in its sovereign capacity or an action in furtherance or
implementation of "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed" state policy." Since Boulder's ordinance was neither, no
immunity was found. The Boulder decision did not, however, ad-
dress the question of antitrust liability of cities on the merits.
The meaning of the Boulder decision is complicated somewhat
by the fact that the City rested its claim of immunity on Colo-
rado's very sweeping grant of "home rule" powers to cities.2 In-
deed, largely because of the breadth of Colorado's constitution,
more than twenty state attorney generals-including the attorney
general of Colorado-filed amici curiae briefs arguing against rec-
ognition of any antitrust immunity. A very different situation
would obtain if a state imposed a "clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed state policy" regarding cable regulation upon cit-
ies and cable operators. For example, New York State has created
a complex regulatory scheme-as well as a State Commission on
Cable Television-to supervise cities' franchising processes and
cable system operations. 0 A city's action under such a regulatory
scheme might be immune from antitrust scrutiny under Boulder.
Beyond Boulder, there already has been some use of antitrust
litigation as a means of contesting franchise awards. For example,
in Houston, Texas, an unsuccessful bidder for a cable franchise
sued the City, the mayor, and the successful bidders, alleging that
they had conspired to divide up the franchise territory; a jury ulti-
mately returned a verdict for more than $6,000,000 against the de-
supra note 23 at 645.
27. 102 S. Ct. 841.
28. 102 S. Ct. 843 (1982).
29. COLO. CONST. art. xx, § 6, quoted in pertinent part at 50 U.S.L.W. 4144 n.1 (1982).
The City argued that its home rule authority was a delegation of state authority and that its
ordinance was therefore "state" action. 102 S. Ct. 843.
30. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 813 (McKinney Supp. 1980). As noted below, however, this scheme
has been subject to deregulation proposals. See note 39, infra.
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fendants.3 ' Although the trial judge granted the defendants' mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the sheer size of the
verdict shows the potential magnitude of antitrust liability.
Although the Supreme Court did not reach the merits in Boul-
der, the substantive antitrust issues in the case are intriguing. It is
less than clear whether the City's actions were pro- or anti-compet-
itive. On the one hand, the moratorium may have been a necessary
means of encouraging new entry into a market which could support
only one firm; if this were the case, restriction of franchise grants
might have been the only means by which the City could receive
the fair market value of its franchise or by which effective competi-
tion for the franchise could exist. On the other hand, the City may
have intended to restrict the market for cable services to only one
firm; this might be contrary to the nation's pro-competition policy
and obviously would not give cable consumers the benefit of com-
petition. As noted above," however, the capital-intensive nature of
cable television seems to make head-to-head competition in the
same geographic area-i.e., "overwiring"-economically infeasible
albeit technically practicable. Realistically, therefore, the first
cable operator to wire an area, whether under either an exclusive
or non-exclusive franchise, obtains a monopoly position.
In addition, if a city could not limit its franchise grants without
running afoul of the antitrust laws, it presumably would be re-
quired to approve any applicant with threshhold financial, techno-
logical and other qualifications. This would be equivalent to hold-
ing cities to be monopolists of "essential facilities" 33-in this case,
their streets. This theory is subject to several major caveats.
First, it is unclear that the relevant geographic market for anti-
trust purposes would be a single city, although cable operators gen-
erally apply for franchises on a city-by-city basis. Since most mul-
tiple systems operators (MSOs) compete for franchises on a
national or regional level, the geographic market might include
every city in the country engaged in initial or renewal franchis-
ing." If this were the case, presumably no one city would have mo-
nopoly power in the relevant geographic area.
Second, the relevant product market might not be acquisition of
31. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
32. See text accompanying note 19, supra.
33. See United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See also, Farrow, supra note 20.
34. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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municipal franchises. Viewed from a consumer's perspective, it
might be provision of cable television service or even all potentially
competing services-such as those discussed in the following sec-
tions.3 5 If the product market were larger than just cable franchises
or cable services, a city's monopoly power over its streets might
amount to control of only a small part of the relevant product
market.
Finally, as noted before,3 the primary and perhaps only compe-
tition among cable operators may be for the award of franchises. In
order for a city to realize the benefits of competition, it may need
to award exclusive franchises. Regardless of the possibly long-term
anti-competitive consequences, grant of a limited number of
franchises may be justified by active competition in the franchising
process. Indeed, the courts have recognized the validity of long-
term exclusive dealing contracts in some situations, although rec-
ognizing their theoretically inhibiting impact on competition."
The nature of competition in the cable television industry thus
may make restrictions by a city on the number of franchise
grants-whether through exclusive franchises, award of single and
thus de facto exclusive franchises, or other means-essential for
the functioning of a normal competitive process. Precisely for this
reason, cable operators have a real interest in reducing cities' abili-
ties to require competitive bidding. One approach is through the
antitrust laws, as discussed above. A second is through state legis-
lation; for example, legislation recently was introduced in New
York State to require cities to award franchises to any qualified
applicant." A major confrontation on this issue is obviously brew-
ing, and its outcome is less than certain."
Since a cable operator gains some monopoly power once it has
wired an area, another potential antitrust problem arises when an
operator refuses to allow third parties to transmit over its system.
35. For example, in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)
(the "cellophane" case), the Court applied a consumers' perspective test to find a rather
broad product market-and thus little market control by a single firm.
36. See text accompanying note 19, supra.
37. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
38. Governor's Program Bill No. 133, N.Y.S. 5753, 1981-82 Sess. (1981). No action was
taken on the bill in 1981, but similar provisions apparently will be re-introduced in 1982.
39. Along similar lines, the cable industry has attempted to secure federal legislation lim-
iting cities' powers to set rates, require franchise fees, and obtain "access" channels. See
draft of S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(h)(i) (1981). These provisions were deleted in the
final Senate version of the bill but probably will re-surface in the House deliberations.
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Because of its tremendous number of channels, cable is a highly
attractive medium for a wide variety of broadband applications. It
can simultaneously carry high-speed data transmision, "pay" pro-
gramming, shopping at home or home security services, and the
like. Until 1979, the Federal Communications Commission re-
quired cable systems to have one or more leased access channels
for these types of needs, to be available under non-discriminatory
rates and terms to all commercial users of cable.40 But, in 1979, the
FCC's regulation was held to be ultra vires by the Supreme
Court.4 1 Some cities have responded by inserting similar leased ac-
cess provisions into their franchises"' and at least one state
agency-the New York. State Commission on Cable Televi-
sion 43-has proposed a similar requirement. But it seems safe to
conclude that most cable operators are under no state or local re-
quirement to provide leased access.
Under an antitrust analysis, exclusion of potential users might
violate the traditional "essential facility" doctrine." Since a cable
operator often has the only available means of broadband trans-
mission, it arguably may have market control for at least some
purposes and thus be required to make at least part of its trans-
mission facilities available." Liability naturally would hinge on
whether any alternative or competitive facility existed; for at least
some applications, such as broadband interactive transmission,
cable arguably may be the only medium available.
Another potential antitrust problem for the cable industry may
be concentration of control under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
which prohibits a merger or acquisition where its effect "may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monop-
oly."4 6 At present there does not appear to be any difficulty on this
score, for even the larger MSOs serve a relatively small percent-
age4 7 of United States cable subscribers. The increasing number of
40. 47 C.F.R. § 76.254 (1980).
41. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). Interestingly enough, the Commis-
sion did not get around to repealing its access rules until the spring of 1981. 83 F.C.C.2d 147
(1980).
42. WHAT TO Do WHEN CABLE COMES TO TOWN: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS (M.
Botein & B. Park eds. 1980).
43. Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking in Docket No. 90174 (Jan. 11, 1980).
44. See text accompanying note 33, supra.
45. Botein, Jurisdictional and Antitrust Considerations in the Regulation of the New
Communications Technologies, 25 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 863, 887 (1980).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1973).
47. The three largest MSO's serve approximately one million subscribers apiece of the
692 [Vol. 3
NEW COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
mergers and acquisitions in the cable industry has not caused any
substantial concern for the FCC, the Justice Department, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission or private litigants.
Moreover, many mergers or acquisitions are vertical rather than
horizontal in nature, i.e., not among competitors. In practice,
broadcasters, program producers, and equipment manufacturers
have entered the market by purchasing cable systems.48 At the
same time, the FCC has relaxed its traditional cross-ownership
rules49 to allow networks to acquire at least minimal interests in
cable systems. 0
If there is any long-term trend toward concentration, closer gov-
ernmental scrutiny might be invoked or private litigation may
arise. Indeed, the Justice Department urged the FCC to adopt
ownership restrictions as long ago as the late 1960's." A deregu-
latory environment might rekindle its concern at some point in the
future, although until now the Department has avoided cross-own-
ership examination.
Finally, new cable systems usually offer different "tiers" of ser-
vice, each providing different types of programming. Commonly,
reception of conventional broadcast stations is classed in "Tier I,"
non-pay satellite-fed programs in "Tier II," and various pay movie
or sports channels in other tiers." This type of arrangement might
create a tying agreement by forcing subscribers to take the first
tier in order to get the others. Although cable service presumably
is not a "commodity" under section 3 of the Clayton Act,53 section
1 of the Sherman Act might be applicable if a cable operator had
monopoly power over all tiers." This type of power might exist if
total twenty million cable subscribers.
48. 'For example, in August 1981, the FCC approved the acquisition of Teleprompter
Cable Corporation-one of the country's largest MSO's-by Westinghouse Broadcasting
Company. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 531 (1981).
49. 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1981).
50. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 587 (1981). The decision allows CBS to
own either one-half of one percent of the total number of United States cable subscribers or
90,000 subscribers, whichever is less.
51. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 695 (1972).
52. As would be expected, each additional tier increases the total cost of service.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 4 (1980). See, L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 433
(1977).
54. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). In Loew's copyrighted movies
were licensed to television stations in packages only. In order to receive broadcast rights to a
specific movie, a station would have to purchase those other movies which were in the same
package. This was held to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id.
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an operator controlled the only source of high quality broadcast
signals and various types of pay signals as well as satellite-fed pro-
grams. As noted before," this determination would depend on the
availability of other competing media.
II.
Subscription Television (STV) and Multipoint
Distribution Service (MDS)
Both STV and MDS stations are able to deliver pay entertain-
ment programming. MDS can also transmit high-speed computer
data instead of or in addition to entertainment programming."
STV stations may be able to do the same since the FCC recently
indicated that low power television stations will be free to transmit
virtually any type of scrambled signal.17 The primary difference
between STV and MDS is that STV operates on channels assigned
by the FCC to conventional broadcast stations, while MDS oper-
ates on microwave frequencies normally used for satellite and
other communications. Under present FCC rules, no more than
two MDS channels are available in even the largest television mar-
kets," thus creating increasingly sharp competition for MDS li-
censes. Because an STV station operates with much higher power
than an MDS station, its signal goes two or three times as far, giv-
ing it a much larger potential audience.5 9
Some of the antitrust issues applicable to cable television also
are relevant to STV and MDS. First, the FCC does not prohibit
local cross-ownership of arguably competing operations where ei-
ther an STV and an MDS station or an MDS station and a cable
system are commonly owned." Since STV, MDS and cable are the
most common means of delivering pay programming or data, local
cross-ownership of these operations might create undue concentra-
tion of control under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, depending upon
how the relevant product market is defined-e.g., all television, all
pay television, or all cable television. The FCC might be able to
immunize existing STV/MDS or MDS/cable cross-ownership from
55. See text accompanying note 36, supra.
56. Supra, note 5, at 805.
57. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 82 F.C.C.2d 47 (1980).
58. 47 C.F.R. § 901 (1980).
59. Supra, note 5.
60. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1980). An STV/cable combination is subject to the same re-
strictions as a conventional broadcast/cable combination. 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1980).
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antitrust liability if it imposed a pervasive regulatory scheme upon
cable, MDS, or ST. At present, however, the Commission has
been moving towards extensive deregulation of all three media."
By analogy to the leased access question in cable television," an-
other problem might be an operator's refusal to carry an STV or
MDS signal. The FCC presently requires cable systems to carry
only the nonscrambled portions of STV signals, and does not man-
date carriage of MDS signals at all." An STV or MDS station
might pay a cable system to carry its signal, of course, as some
STV and MDS operators have done. A cable system might refuse
to carry an STV or MDS station, however, because it would com-
pete with a cable operator's own pay programming. Although state
or local leased access requirements might force a cable operator to
carry an MDS or STV signal, few cable operators face such con-
straints." As with leased access in general, a cable operator might
face liability for refusing to deal with an STV or MDS station.
Cable, STV, and MDS tend to offer the same or similar en-
tertainment fare. If one of these media acquired exclusive rights to
a particular type of programming, such as a substantial number of
first-run movies, others might encounter problems of refusal to
deal. For example, if program producers entered into long-term ex-
clusive dealing arrangements with a particular network of cable
systems, STV stations or MDS operations, the question of refusal
to deal might arise."
III.
Videodises and Videocassettes
Videodiscs and videscassettes are means of distributing pro-
gramming, and perhaps some types of data,6 7 on a pay basis for
viewing in an individual home or business. Although videodisc and
videocassette players produce roughly the same type of image on a
conventional television set, they operate through radically different
61. See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
62. K. Glen, Report on Subscription Television, and K. Glen, Report on Multipoint Dis-
tribution Service, in Preliminary Report on Prospects for New Networks (FCC Network
Inquiry Study Staff 1980).
63. See text accompanying notes 40-44, supra.
64. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.59-76.63 (1980).
65. See text accompanying notes 42-43, supra.
66. United States v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
67. Although a cassette or disc obviously cannot provide real-time interaction, it may con-
tain sufficient data to give a consumer the appearance of an interactive system.
No. 4]1 695
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means. A videodisc uses either a mechanical stylus-somewhat like
that in a phonograph-or a laser beam to render a video image
from the disc; a videocassette uses magnetic tape to record and
play back a video signal. Videodisc units are generally less expen-
sive than videocassette units, but lack the recording capability of
videocassette units. 8
Since videodiscs and videocassettes are comparatively new, it is
difficult to predict the antitrust issues which may arise. First, there
may be a trerid in both fields toward some type of "industry stan-
dards" dictating, among other things, a particular type of disc,
tape, or format for display. To the extent that these standards
benefit some manufacturers and exclude others, they may be sub-
ject to antitrust scrutiny." If nothing else, the procedures for
promulgating standards probably would need to be open to all po-
tential manufacturers.
As with cable, MDS, and STV, questions also may arise as to the
availability of programming. If one videodisc or videocassette man-
ufacturer controlled a substantial amount of potential program-
ming through exclusive dealing arrangements, questions as to re-
fusals to deal might arise."
IV.
Satellites
There are basically two types of satellites: (1) domestic satellites
("domsats"), which are in operation now; and (2) direct broadcast
satellites ("DBS"), which are to be widely operational in the near
future. Domsats serve as common carrier links for telephone, data,
and video communication. Perhaps their most dramatic role in the
last few years has been to transmit pay programming nationally to
cable, STV, and MDS operations.
Domsats generally transmit with comparatively little power, and
thus cannot be received by individual viewers without a fairly sub-
stantial (i.e., $5,000 to $15,000) investment in an earth station ca-
pable of receiving domsat signals for display on a conventional tel-
evision set. By comparison, a DBS transmitter would have
considerably higher power and thus would require inexpensive
68. See M. SPRAGUE, NEW COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA AND PUBLIC BROADCASTING: IMPACTS
AND OPPORTUNITIES 22 (1980).
69. See National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1979).
70. See text accompanying note 66, supra.
696 [Vol. 3
NEW COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
(i.e., $200-$300) receivers.7 ' Aside from a few experimental applica-
tions, DBS is still on the drawing boards, with the earliest possible
introduction probably coming in the mid to late 1980s.
Domsats are common carriers and must file tariffs with the FCC.
Under recent Commission decisions, however, purchasers of dom-
sat transmission time are virtually free to resell it to whomever
and at whatever prices they choose.7 3 A section 27 problem thus
might arise if one purchaser were able to control a substantial por-
tion of the comparatively limited number of domsat channels.7 5
This type of situation might be analogized to the "essential facil-
ity" cases discussed above."
Potential antitrust issues as to direct broadcast satellites are less
clear because DBS still is in the planning stages. Although the
FCC has advocated an "open skies" or "open entry" policy as to
domsats," there may be significant technological, economic and
treaty restrictions on the number of DBS transmitters which could
operate within the United States. None of these issues can be re-
solved, however, until the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio
Conference.7 8 On the one hand, if the Commission ultimately regu-
lates DBS operations as common carriers, their facilities would be
available to all paying customers. On the other hand, if the Com-
mission regulates DBS stations as broadcasters, they would have
sole control over the content of their transmissions." But the FCC
adopts the broadcast model, the previously discussed problems as
to refusals to deal and essential facilities might become relevant in
the DBS context.
V.
71. An investment in an earth station may run from $5,000 to $15,000. The cost of a DBS
transmitter is $200 to $300.
72. Supra note 5. The FCC recently accepted applications for DBS faciliites, despite the
fact that it still was in the process of drafting rules to cover DBS. BROADCASTING, July 20,
1981, at 23.
73. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976); Memorandum Report and
Order, 62 F.C.C.2d 588 (1977).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1980) (Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890).
75. Several firms recently announced plans to launch new domsats, thus increasing dra-
matically the number of available channels. See BROADCASTING, Aug. 17, 1981, at 32.
76. See text accompanying note 33, supra.
77. Second Report and Order, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, 850-51 (1972). The Commission basically
decided to allow any qualified applicant to operate domsats. Id.
78. Rice, Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellites: International Constraints and Do-
mestic Options, 25 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 813, 822 (1980).
79. Id. at 837.
No. 4] 697
Comm/ENT LAW JOURNAL
Data Transmission and Other Videotext Services
During the last few years, at least half a dozen different-and
technologically incompatible-videotext systems for transmitting
large amounts of data to homes and businesses have developed. Al-
though an enormous number of permutations and combinations
exist, the basic distinction is between teletext and viewdata.
Teletext operates in a one-way fashion and allows a home or busi-
ness to subscribe to textual information transmitted over a cable
system, MDS operation, or other station. By transmitting a large
amount of data-e.g., up to 200,000 pages on a cable or MDS chan-
nel-and giving subscribers a choice of data, one-way teletext sys-
tems simulate interactivity.
On the other hand, viewdata systems generally give subscribers a
return link to a computer over telephone lines or a cable system, so
that they can order particular information from a comparatively
large, continuously available menu at any time. A variety of sys-
tems are currently under experimentation in the United States,
Great Britain, Europe, and Japan.80
The proliferation of different and incompatible videotext tech-
nologies has created pressure for uniform standards. The antitrust
problem with any set of standards, however, is that it may benefit
one set of interests and annihilate all others. As discussed above in
relation to videodiscs,"1 the mere establishment of industry stan-
dards does not in and of itself create antitrust liability. Proper
processes in formulating standards are necessary, however, in order
to avoid inferences of anti-competitive motives.
Aside from the problem of diverse and incompatible standards,
the teletext and viewdata industries-particularly newspapers and
news wire services-face increasing amounts of competition from a
deregulated American Telephone and Telegraph Company. AT&T
has developed a teletext-style offering, which not unsurprisingly
provoked the ire of newspapers interested in electronic publishing.
A federal district court enjoined AT&T from implementing its
teletext system" on the ground that the system would violate the
80. INSTITUTE FOR THE FUTURE, REPORT (1981).
81. See text accompanying note 69, supra.
82. Several major firms-including CBS, AT&T, and Telidon-have announced at least
tentative agreements on a set of uniform standards. TELEVISION/RADIO AGE, Sept. 22, 1980,
at 33. CBS and AT&T are experimenting with jointly agreed upon standards. Id.
83. Texas Daily Newspaper Ass'n v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., - F. Supp. -
(E.D. Tex. 1981).
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1956 Consent Decree between AT&T and the Justice Department.
This issue is, of course, just part of the far broader issues involved
in deregulating AT&T, a subject which has received action from
the FCC," the Hill" and most recently the courts in dealing with
the proposed AT&T Consent Decree"
Conclusion
Many of the above issues could be resolved by the FCC; they will
not be, however, because of the federal government's current der-
egulatory orgy. The FCC's failure or refusal to address these issues
will lead to increased antitrust litigation and other private means
of resolving economic disputes. When substantial economic inter-
ests are unable to receive any redress from administrative agencies,
they naturally turn to other forums-most particularly Congress
and the courts. Relief under the antitrust laws is particularly at-
tractive, since it may pay its own way through treble damages and
attorneys' fees. The antitrust laws thus will play an increasingly
larger role in adjusting disputes in the telecommunications
industries.
84. Report and Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) ("Computer II" proceedings).
85. S.898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See Schwartz, Stacked Competition and Phony
Deregulation for A.T.&T: The Proposed "Telecommunications Competition and Deregula-
tion Act of 1981," 3 CoMM/ENT L.J. 411 (1982).
86. Schwartz, supra note 85.
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